Introduction
Global realities are characterized by marked shifts in power relations and economic interaction not least by the so-called emerging economies. This had a direct impact on the African continent, which is not any longer the backyard of Europe's erstwhile colonial powers or the West in general. The Brazil-India-China-Russia-South Africa emphasis from aid to trade as a means of increased "hegemonic control" (Farrell, 2008) .
While some believe that ACP countries, by "facing the giant" (Fioramonti/Poletti, 2008) have in essence "nothing to gain and everything to lose" (Brown, 2005: 9) the EU also has more to lose than to gain -at least in terms of reputation and acceptance concerning its Africa policy. In the absence of sufficient capacity among the ACP countries to meaningfully negotiate the EU proposals vis-á-vis the "well oiled trade negotiation machinery of the EU" (Grimm, 2005: 24) many ACP countries felt bullied into procedures and arrangements they actually resisted. "Partnership" is seen as a dubious euphemism for continued policies guided by European interests.
The debacle "arguably shows that the EU has not yet been able to rethink this relationship beyond the classical categories of dependence and dominion, hidden under the benevolent image of 'partnership'." (Fioramonti, 2011: 23) The EPA initiative turned new actors into an attractive alternative. Somehow indicative, the Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa urged on 31
st August 2005 at the headquarters of the AU "African leaders to think afresh about the place of our continent in a rapidly globalising world". 2 African countries gained new operational space. While this might strengthen the negotiating power and be in favor of economic interests seeking to achieve maximum gains, it also provoked the fear "that the political consequences for democracy, human rights, and conflict prevention will be overwhelmingly negative" (Tull, 2006a: 36; see also Tull, 2006b) . Africa has emerged, in the view of many, as "a vital arena of strategic and geopolitical competition" and "the final frontier" (Klare/Volman, 2006: 297) .
Since then numerous analyses dealt mainly with the Chinese impact and practices (see i.a. Broadman, 2007; Lee et.al., 2007; Manji/Marks, 2007; Rotberg, 2008; Alden/Large/Soares de Oliveira, 2008; Michel/Beuret, 2009; van Dijk, 2009 ). In contrast, the unabated European and US-American policies and interests seem to feature much less prominently.
China -the (not so) new kid on the block
China is no newcomer to Africa, but can look back on "a century of engagement" (Shinn/Eisenman, 2012 to resolving problems to the benefit of African development" as a form of SouthSouth cooperation, in which "all members are developing countries, and they are equal" (Li et. al., 2012: 56) . In 2011, trade between China and Africa reached US$ 160 billion and investments totaled more than US$ 13 billion (van Nieuwkerk, 2012: 14) . While the Chinese scholars maintain that "promoting African development is the objective of ChinaAfrica cooperation" (Li et. al., 2012: 57) 
What's in it for Africa?
Despite unprecedented economic growth rates for many African economies since the turn of the century, the resource curse is still looming for those countries, which currently benefit most from the conjuncture. The windfall profits, the positive terms of trade and trade balances as well as the economic growth rates do not in itself indicate sustainable positive changes towards poverty reduction and secure livelihoods for the majority of the people. Inequalities and social disparities might well increase further in midst of a growing segment of beneficiaries, who are able to siphon off the revenue incomes for their private enrichment in a global pact among elites.
Institutional quality and sound economic policies remain substantial ingredients for a development paradigm benefiting the majority of people in the affected societies.
Governing the access to resources through appropriate rent and revenue management policies as well as by improving policy design and implementation are as important as a diversification of the economy and the creation of human and social capital (Wohlmuth, 2007: 11f.) . African states and their governments on the one hand and major international corporations on the other are very unequal partners. In many cases neither the governments nor the people in the resource rich areas are aware of the cash flow generated by the exploitation of the raw materials, and they hardly derive any benefit (with the exception of the odd accomplices in the business deals):
In settings where initial political and economic institutions are relatively weak, dependence on primary commodities, especially natural resources such as oil, appears to have encouraged predatory government behaviour and rentseeking, deterring the development of stable, democratic institutions that are conducive to growth. (Jerome/Wohlmuth, 2007: 201) A report based on six case studies observed that the government, particularly the executive, in many cases in Africa is comprised of a political elite whose reality is very much removed from the rest of the population. This results in policy-makers and influential opinion-leaders crafting policy approaches that are not beneficial to the more impoverished sectors of the population. (Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007: viii) New deals with China do not necessarily improve governance. Chinese foreign policy is attractive for autocratic leaders and oligarchies still in power over societies, which are run like the private property of cliques. Guided by its gospel of nonintervention, China provides grants and loans to kleptocracies with dubious human rights records and is not petty-minded when it comes to the funding modalities (Henderson, 2008: 12f.) . Transparency and accountability are not among the core values cultivated in African-Chinese links, and Beijing's notion of human rights is at best dubious (Taylor, 2008 ) -though notably so neither the West has despite occasional claims to the opposite been a role model in rigorously pursuing concerns over human rights violations (Breslin/Taylor, 2008) . Double standards and hypocrisy prevail when it comes to interests in profit maximization.
For Chinese enterprises, however, more is at stake than merely securing access to new markets and resources. Once being part of the game, "China seeks, as do all investors, a stable and secure investment environment" (Mohan/Power, 2008: 37) .
Chinese foreign policy seems indeed to be adapting. Leaving behind the earlier fundamentals, "China has moved from outright obstructionism and a defensive insistence on solidarity with the developing world to an attempt at balancing its material needs with its acknowledged responsibilities as a major power" ( focus beyond a reduced Sino-African dichotomy termed as a reductionist "dragon in the bush" perspective (Large, 2008) . There remain great dangers in the current competitive constellation, which "demonstrates that all of the countries in the scramble are driven largely by national interests, and that their behavior is conditioned far more by competition with each other than by the noble sentiments enshrined in their policy documents and press releases" (Habib, 2008: 274) . This echoes concerns in a report for the Development Committee of the European Parliament. It concluded that the major external actors operating in Africa "are wary that their urgent domestic needs will be compromised if they distance themselves of their own opportunistic and self-centred policies" and diagnosed that "short-term gains still prevail over long-term stability" (Holslag et. al., 2007: 50) .
In the light of this primacy of own interests the crafting of an African response to has not yet been any truly coherent African policy on other matters either, given the variety of political regimes and interests on the continent.
Which Development?
With new powerful actors operating, one needs to re-visit the aid and development paradigms to see if and how they change or how the changing economic relationships impact on defined priorities as well as potential collaboration (see after the USA (7.2 billion), the EC (6.0 billion), the World Bank (4.1 billion), France (3.4 billion), Germany (2.7 billion), the UK (2.6 billion) and Japan (1.6 billion) (Brautigam, 2011a: 211) . (Dollar, 2008 ). This sounds not too different from the Western development discourse. It is questionable whether this is good news for Africa (see for a debate Schoeman, 2008 and Melber, 2008) .
There are voices that are more reluctant than others to argue for a welcoming embrace of a new global player, which after all might not change the rules of the game. Their fear is that China in the end merely offers more of the same. In particular those representing a labor movement perspective argue that the employment conditions in Chinese companies tend to be even worse (see Jauch/Sakaria, 2009; It is time for Africans to wake up to the realities of their romance with China.
[…] China is no longer a fellow under-developed economy -it is the world's second-biggest, capable of the same forms of exploitation as the west. It is a significant contributor to Africa's deindustrialization and underdevelopment. […] Africa must recognise that China -like the US, Russia, Britain, Brazil and the rest -is in Africa not for African interests but its own. The romance must be replaced by hard-nosed economic thinking. (Sanusi, 2013) 
The Need for a Responsible Government and State Policy
The increased competition for entering favorable relations with African countries is in itself of course not negative to the interests of the African people. But it requires that the tiny elites benefiting from the currently existing unequal structures put their own interest in trans-nationally linked self-enrichment schemes behind the public interest. The priority should be to create investment and exchange patterns, which provide in the first place benefits for the majority of role. There is maneuvering space and room for negotiations with any external interests seeking own gains, which could be used if the political will exists.
Many remain skeptical over the dominant exchange mechanisms. The motive of such skepticism is not to protect Western or Northern interests at stake. On the contrary: the fear is that China at the end merely offers more of the same.
Indications at this stage seem to suggest that rather Chinese engagement in Africa tends to accommodate Western norms instead of seeking to move Africa towards Chinese norms and away from Western influence. It needs to be pointed out, that there is no inherent conflict between China's interests in Africa and development, good governance and democracy on the continent. Indeed, stronger African partners would both offer a more stable environment for China's investments and help China to address any problems that emerged in the course of its African ventures far more satisfactorily and sustainably than weaker and more acquiescent ones. (Raine, 2009: 234) The interaction between Africa and China brings us back to the roles of the policies of the governments, of the state, of political office bearers, civil servants and the all too weak local bourgeoisie, anything but acting 'patriotic'. If and to which extent the majority of the African people benefit from the old and new actors on their continent depends at the end as so often once again to a large extent upon their rulers -and not least but most importantly on their own social struggles. But it also requires the state as an actor, who provides the arena for such struggles without being the machinery for oppression and the vehicle for the interests of a tiny elite.
The impact of the new global players and their economic engagement with African countries "will depend on what African countries do, in terms of initial conditions, better bargaining, and appropriate policies, to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs associated with the process of increasing economic interaction" (Nayyar, 2012: 559) . It will ultimately depend on Africans, "whether resource dependence and authoritarianism on the continent can be overcome" (Carmody, 2011: 194) . In the end, Africa should "lay down the criteria that should control the activities of external powers" (Arnold, 2009: 237) , and African development should be "its own responsibility" (Morrissey/Zgovu, 2011: 41) . It seems "just a matter of allowing Africa to use whatever resources nature has granted it to genuinely pull itself out of poverty" (Frindéthié, 2010: 173) . -But all that is easier said than done. It requires "a policy that can only be pursued by governments that are legitimate and have a vision for their countries" (Djoumessi, 2009: 284) -not only a desire for enriching themselves by entering pacts among global elites.
The emerging "resource nationalism", which results in governments introducing a stronger control over the allocation of rights for the exploitation of natural resources, is an important strategic initiative. It provokes already careful assessments by those who have so far benefitted from the access to these resource markets notably in Southern Africa (Burgess/Beilstein, 2013) . Establishing such additional state control is in principle a step into the right direction -provided that this is not limited once again to a self-enrichment scheme through appropriation of revenue and rent seeking by the elites in control over the state.
The state will be an important element in the engagement with external and internal forces in the process of socio-economic development. State agencies emerged as a result of the separation between politics and economy. The main feature of the state is that it is not 'owned' by any individual or group, even though it is never really neutral. It nonetheless bases its legitimacy on the claim to be a broker between conflicting interests as a regulating body, seeking to represent and reconcile different agencies in a public interest.
Often, however, governments exercise power and major influence over state policies without representing the majority of people. Despite their claims for autonomy from daily politics and justifying its existence beyond governments, states unashamedly so reflect the power relations. As a 'material condensation' they mirror interests as represented by social classes, agencies and lobby groups. As a factor of and tool for domination states often enforce the interests of an elite.
Thus, influential parts of business all too often exercise the power of definition as to the role of the state in development and the kind of development. But, the goals and functioning of social management cannot be equated with business logic. Much more needs to be done to ensure such essential aspects as access, equity, sustainability and efficiency. (United Nations Secretariat,
1997: 30)
A responsible state acting in the truly public interest will have to introduce measures, which contribute to general security and wellbeing of all people living in the territory it controls and represents. This includes a protection against the abuse of access to public goods and the protection of -often over-exploited non-renewable -natural resources and needs to minimize if not to eliminate practices for the benefit of some at the expense of others. Laws are part of the instruments a state has, as well as tax policy. A responsible state needs to be a courageous state, confronting forces that disempower people(s). Such a responsible state adds legitimacy to the political elite in government. Its priorities, in turn, would make it a secondary matter from where the external agencies and stakeholders come, with whom negotiations are entered and possibly turned into business -provided it is not the business as usual.
